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ANTITRUST
OVERVIEW
During the past term, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
reviewed two cases involving fundamental antitrust issues. Spe-
cifically, the court focused on the general bounds of the predatory
pricing concept in the Tenth Circuit' and upon the ramifications
of Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. for the territorial
marketing system used by the Adolph Coors Company.' Both of
the cases to be discussed represent the court's struggle with two
developing analytical frameworks that may have far reaching
impact for antitrust litigation in the Tenth Circuit.
I. PREDATORY PRICING: Pacific Engineering & Production Co. v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S.
Ct. 234 (1977)
Pacific Engineering & Production Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.
3
involved a suit by a manufacturer of a rocket fuel chemical, Pa-
cific Engineering, against its competitor, Kerr-McGee.' The trial
court found Kerr guilty of monopolizing and attempting to mo-
nopolize in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act,5 and of price
discrimination in violation of section 2(a) of the Robinson-
Patman Act.' The Tenth Circuit reversed the trial court's award
to Pacific Engineering [PE] of treble damages of $4,590,594.00
and attorneys' fees of $528,000.00 on the basis that the antitrust
laws were inapplicable to the facts before the court.
Pacific Engineering and Prod. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 97 S. Ct, 234 (1977). See notes 3-26 and accompanying text infra.
2 Adolph Coors Co. v. A&S Wholesalers, Inc., Nos. 76-1227 and 76-1228 (10th Cir.,
March 16, 1977) (Not for Routine Publication). See notes 27-43 and accompanying text
infra.
551 F.2d 790 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 234 (1977).
Kerr counterclaimed against PE for engaging in a group boycott by agreeing with
two major buyers to take "stay alive" orders. The trial court dismissed the counterclaim
and the Tenth Circuit upheld the dismissal on the basis that the findings of fact were not
clearly erroneous. 551 F.2d at 799.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970) states that: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt
to monopolize, or combine or conspire . . . to monopolize ... shall be deemed guilty of
a felony ....
6 Id. § 13(a) (1970) states that: "It shall be unlawful for any person ... to sell, or
contract to sell, goods ... at prices lower than those exacted by said person elsewhere in
the United States for the purposes of destroying competition .... "
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Kerr and Pacific Engineering manufactured a chemical used
in rocket fuel. The major buyers of the chemical, of which there
were only three,7 were manufacturers of missiles for the federal
government. Thus, demand was fixed by the government. At one
time there were four companies manufacturing the chemical, but
due to the reduction in the space program budget, only Kerr and
PE were still engaged in production by 1966.
Citing United States v. Grinnell, the court recognized that
the traditional elements of a monopolization claim are possession
of monopoly power in the relevant market and the willful acquisi-
tion or maintenance of that power, as distinguished from power
derived from a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident.' The court also relied upon the general rule that a find-
ing of an attempt to monopolize requires proof of both a specific
intent to monopolize and a dangerous probability of successful
monopolization However, instead of applying these rules to the
facts, the court identified the crucial issue as whether or not the
defendant had engaged in predatory price cutting. 0
The court found the defendant's prices to be below its total
cost. Below-cost pricing is often one indication of predatory in-
tent." However, the court construed the Supreme Court's state-
ment that below-cost pricing may be considered predatory as not
constituting a definitive standard for determining the existence
of predatory pricing. According to the court, under some circum-
stances, below-cost pricing might even be considered beneficial. 13
The court noted that any price-cutting must to some extent be attributed to the
three major buyers' method of soliciting bids. Preliminary bids would establish a ceiling
price. Often they would tell a bidder that he should go lower if he wanted to get the bid.
Sometimes this resulted in the low bidder underbidding himself. Id. at 792.
See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1965). For subsequent
adoptions of the Grinnell test, see also United States v. Empire Gas Co., 537 F.2d 296,
302-07 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 915 (1977); Morton Bldgs. of Neb., Inc. v.
Morton Bldgs., Inc., 531 F.2d 910, 918 (8th Cir. 1976).
' See E.J. Delaney Corp. v. Bonne Bell, Inc., 525 F.2d 296 (10th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 907 (1976).
IC 551 F.2d at 796. Since the plaintiff's claim of monopolization was based primarily
on the defendant's pricing tactics, the court apparently felt the intent behind such pricing
to be determinative.
" Total cost equals fixed costs (management expenses, depreciation property taxes,
etc.) plus variable costs (labor, material, fuel, and any other cost which varies with
output). 551 F.2d at n.2.
' Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 696 n.12 (1967).




The court acknowledged that there was ample evidence that
the defendant knew PE could not survive at the low price level.
The defendant had conducted extensive surveillance of the plain-
tiff's activities and was well informed of the plaintiff's plight,
especially with respect to its financial situation."
The evidence showed that Kerr once offered to "dump" a
nonexistent surplus of the chemical to a PE customer at ex-
tremely low prices. It also appeared that the defendant raised its
prices when the collapse of PE seemed certain, only to lower them
when PE seemed to recover. Kerr's market share had also in-
creased steadily since 1966.1
The court ignored this evidence and instead turned its atten-
tion to the "crucial" fact that Kerr's prices were above its average
variable cost." The court cited Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp.7 for the
proposition that section 2 of the Sherman Act does not prohibit
"reasonable" price fluctuations. The court agreed with Professors
Areeda and Turner 8 that marginal costs or average variable costs
are the appropriate standards for determining the existence of a
predatory intent as opposed to a "reasonable" fluctuation."
The court preferred to ignore the traditional application of
antitrust law to such facts 0 and instead utilized what can be
called an "economic reality" approach to the issue. Both compa-
nies were operating below capacity.2' Small price cuts were appar-
", Id. at 792-93. The court noted that Pacific Engineering was a one-product company
and was vastly undercapitalized.
" Id. at 793-94.
Average variable cost is the sum of all variable costs divided by output. Id. at 792
n.3. The court also pointed out that in this industry the marginal costs decrease as output
increases. Id. at 796 n.7.
17 510 F.2d 894, 927 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
" Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. Ray. 697 (1975).
"1 The court noted that "there is no indication of when downward price changes cease
to be reasonable." 551 F.2d at 797.
n See United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333 (1969) and United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), both supporting the position that price
leadership is to be condemned. The court also cited Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Para-
mount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954) and Cackling Acres, Inc. v. Olson Farms,
Inc., 541 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1976) for the general rule that parallel pricing may involve
many of the same vices. 551 F.2d at 796.
11 Recognizing that price leadership would invoke all the disadvantages of monopoly,
the court believed that invocation of the antitrust laws would encourage, rather than
discourage this result. 551 F.2d at 796.
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ently effective in increasing market share. PE was obviously in
an unsound condition. The court stated that it found the destruc-
tion of Pacific Engineering via price-cutting and the resulting
monopoly economically preferable to a price leadership oligopoly.
According to the court, price leadership would result in a selling
price higher than it would be in a monopoly situation.2 2 Therefore,
the court held that under the circumstances of the case, below-
cost pricing was more consistent with the competitive goals of the
antitrust laws than to prevent such price-cutting to save a floun-
dering company. In the court's estimation, such pricing was
"rational, competitive behavior" rather than predatory action.2 1
However, the court did limit its holding by stating that even
under the facts of this case prices could have been set so low as
to be considered predatory.2' Apparently this limitation means
pricing below average variable costs or marginal costs may be
construed as predatory.
Robinson-Patman Charges- The allegations of discrimina-
tion under the Robinson-Patman Act 25 were based upon the fact
that the defendant sold to a number of small-volume purchasers,
constituting a relatively small percentage of the market, at sched-
uled prices which were higher than the bids submitted to the
large-volume buyers. The court stated that the Robinson-Patman
Act should be interpreted no differently than the Sherman Act.
The court then dismissed the price discrimination charges on the
basis that it had already determined that the defendant was en-
gaging in lawful competition without any predatory intent and
thus there was no injury to competition under Robinson-Patman.
The court recognized that its decision would result in the
demise of many small businesses in the face of the pressures
applied by their larger competitor. The court summarized its
policy by stating that "[bligness . . . is not a disqualification
to compete. '2 In this case the Tenth Circuit was obviously con-
cerned with the economic realities of business. The antitrust laws
were not to be applied, however, in order to save a company which
the court viewed as doomed. It is obvious that the court consid-
n Id.
n Id. at 797.
,A Id.
n 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970).
0 551 F.2d at 799.
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ered the plaintiff an unsound, ineffective competitor and a bur-
den on society who should be purged from the marketplace by any
means, even those questionable from an antitrust viewpoint. The
opinion demonstrates a bias for those who can and do compete.
This case seems to place an additional burden on the shoulders
of the smaller competitor plaintiff: he must be able to show that
he is a sound business and thus "worthy" of the protection of the
antitrust laws.
II. RULE OF REASON: Adolph Coors Co. v. A&S Wholesalers, Inc.,
Nos. 76-1227 and 76-1228 (10th Cir., March 16, 1977) (Not for
Routine Publication)
One of the most significant antitrust cases decided by the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals during 1977 was Adolph Coors Co.
v. A&S Wholesalers, Inc.Y Of primary importance in this case
was the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of the Supreme Court deci-
sion, Continental T. V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc.,2 8 viewed in
' Nos. 76-1227 and 76-1228 (10th Cir. March 16, 1977)(Not for Routine Publication).
Adolph Coors Company [Coors] initiated a suit in 1973 seeking to enjoin A&S Wholesal-
ers, Inc. [A&S] from purchasing Coors beer from Colorado retailers and transporting it
to North Carolina for resale to retail outlets. On June 5, 1973, A&S filed an amended
answer and counterclaim alleging that Coors had violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act (see note 6 infra) in that Coors, Coors Distributing Company, and other unknown
persons had combined and conspired to impose customer and territorial restrictions upon
independent distributors, wholesalers, and retailers in the sale of Coors beer. A&S re-
quested damages and injunctive relief. Both parties appealed from the district court's
order dismissing Coors' complaint and A&S's counterclaim, and dissolving the prelimi-
nary injunction. Id. at 2.
" 97 S. Ct. 2549 (1977). Prior to this decision vertical restrictions were governed by
the per se rule announced in United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
In Continental T. V., Inc., the Supreme Court concluded that:
[Tihe appropriate decision is to return to the rule of reason that governed
vertical restrictions prior to Schwinn. When competitive effects are shown
to result from particular vertical restrictions they can be adequately policed
under the rule of reason, the standard traditionally applied for the majority
of anticompetitive practices challenged under Section 1 of the Act.
Id. at 2562.
An often cited statement of the rule of reason is that of Justice Brandeis in Chicago
Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918):
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such
as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the
court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which
the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was im-
posed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The
history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the
particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant
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the wake of an earlier Tenth Circuit decision Adolph Coors Co.
v. FTC.2 Also of note was the Tenth Circuit's recognition of the
applicability of federal antitrust laws to the regulation of liquor
traffic, despite the twenty-first amendment's vesting of the regu-
lations of such traffic within the borders of the respective states
to the states.
The facts in A&S Wholesalers are of some significance be-
cause of the uniqueness of Coor's operation. Coors is the fourth
largest brewery in terms of national consumption. In order to
guarantee the integrity of its product, Coors has historically lim-
ited resale by its 167 distributors to ten and one-half of the west-
ern states. A distinctive feature of Coors is that it is the only
"shipping brewery", i.e., Coors transports its product from its
plant at Golden to the various distributors. The primary method
employed by the brewery to maintain product integrity has been
the implementation of a closely monitored program of refrigera-
tion and rotation by the distributors.0
In 1974, the Tenth Circuit in Adolph Coors v. FTC31 held that
the territorial restrictions on resale imposed by Coors were viola-
tive of section 1 of the Sherman Act;32 in light of the per se rule
for vertical restrictions announced in United States v. Arnold
Schwinn & Co. 33 The court, in dicta, noted:
facts. This is not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectiona-
ble regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of the intent may help
the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.
Id. at 4831 n.15.
- 497 F.2d 1978 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975). The Tenth
Circuit, bound by the Schwinn per se rule, concluded that Coors' territorial restrictions
were violative of the Sherman Act. However, there were indications that the court wished
to rule otherwise. Id. at 1187.
Nos. 76-1227 and 76-1228 at 6.
" 497 F.2d at 1187.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). This section provides, in pertinent part: "Every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal
388 U.S. 365 (1967). The Supreme Court held that:
Once the manufacturer has parted with title and risk, he has parted with
dominion over the product, and his effort thereafter to restrict territory or
persons to whom the product may be transferred, whether by explicit agree-
ment or by silent combination or understanding with his vendee is a per se




Although we are compelled to follow the Schwinn per se rule, we
believe that the per se rule should yield to situations where a
unique product requires territorial restrictions to remain in busi-
ness. . . . Perhaps the Supreme Court may see the wisdom of
grafting an exception to the per se rule when a product is unique
and where the manufacturer can justify its territorial restraints
under the rule of reason. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372
U.S. 253 (1963) (emphasis added).'
This language demonstrates that the Tenth Circuit sought to
protect Coors' interest in its "unique" product, but was precluded
from doing so because of the continued vitality of the Schwinn
per se rule for vertical restrictions.
The ruling for which the Tenth Circuit had been waiting
came on June 23, 1977, when the Supreme Court decided
Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 5 Justice Powell
adopted the rule of reason test for vertical restrictions35 and ex-
pressly overruled the Schwinn per se rule.
37
It was in the aftermath of GTE Sylvania that the Tenth
Circuit was called upon to decide Adolph Coors Co. v. A &S Who-
lesalers, Inc. 31 In this case, A&S contended that Coors'
efforts at firm and resolute enforcement of territorial restrictions
on resale of its products constituted a per se violation of section
1 of the Sherman Act. The court noted that, with the overruling
of the Schwinn per se doctrine, the vertical restrictions and con-
trols imposed by Coors would have to be tested under "the rule
of reason, that is, whether they are required in order to protect
497 F.2d at 1187.
97 S. Ct. 2549 (1977).
, See note 2 supra.
1 For a full description of the Schwinn per se rule, see note 7 supra. Regarding
Continental T. V., Inc., Mr. Handler notes that:
[T]he Court could have confined its ruling to the narrow facts of record, as
Justice White proposed in his concurrence, instead, it adopted a rationale
applicable to all vertical restraints without limitation. The Court did not
hesitate to overrule Schwinn, a mischievous precedent which rested on a
nonexistent principle of ancient property law, which was historically incor-
rect, indefensible as a matter of logic, and unjustifiable as a matter of eco-
nomics.
(Citations omitted).
See, M. Handler, Changing Trends in Antitrust Doctrines: An Unprecedented Su-
preme Court Term - 1977, RECORD OF THE AssOCIATnON OF THE BAR OF THE CrTY OF NEW YORK
530, 532 (Nov. 1977).
Nos. 76-1227 and 76-1228 at 13.
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and insure the 'quality and integrity' of its beer product."39
Recognizing the need for a full evidentiary hearing at the trial
level to examine the impact of the rule of reason on Coors' verti-
cal restrictions, the case was remanded to the trial court. In light
of the statements in Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC, it is likely that
this time Coors' interests in its "unique" product will be afforded
some degree of protection.
The Tenth Circuit did, however, dispose of Coors' contention
that the twenty-first amendment vested the regulation of liquor
traffic within the borders of the respective states to the states,
and "this, by necessary implication, denies application of federal
antitrust laws which would defeat state policy governing the
traffic of alcoholic beverages." 0 The Colorado statutes do seem
to sanction vertical restrictions which have the effect of eliminat-
ing interterritorial competition between Coors' wholesalers."
However, there are no statutes sanctioning the type of vertical
customer or territorial restrictions imposed by Coors. The Colo-
rado state courts have not yet been forced to address the interplay
between the Colorado statutes and Coors' twenty-first amend-
ment contentions. In view of the lack of controlling state decisions
or precedents, the Tenth Circuit afforded the federal district
judge's views great weight. 2 The appellate court thus concluded
that the trial court did not err in its conclusion that "the state's
power to regulate liquor traffic under the twenty-first amendment
provides the plaintiff with no defense to the antitrust claim here
asserted."
In summary, the court's adoption of the "rule of reason" test,
as used in deciding GTE Sylvania, marked the demise in the
Tenth Circuit of the Schwinn per se rule for vertical restrictions.
Vertical restrictions will now be tested under the rule of reason
standard. 3 Under this new standard, the Tenth Circuit may have
greater leeway in fashioning legal protection for manufacturers
like Coors. In view of the court's statements in Adolph Coors Co.
v. FTC, it appears likely that the court not only may, but will,
" Id. at 18.
COLO. Rav. STAT. §§ 12-47-108(2), 124(4).
" See Volis v. Puritan Life Ins. Co., 548 F.2d 895 (10th Cir. 1977); Joyce v. Davis,
539 F.2d 1262 (10th Cir. 1976); Warde v. Davis, 494 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1974).
4 Nos. 76-1227 and 76-1228 at 18.
' See note 2 supra.
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do so. Therefore, as a result of the combination of GTE Sylvania
and Adolph Coors Co. v. A&S Wholesalers, Inc., it may become
extremely difficult for both retailers and distributors to prove
antitrust violations for vertical restrictions in the Tenth Circuit.
Neil E. Lipson
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